considered an indication and not necessarily proof. Statistical tests carry their own baggage.
Statistical tests of efficiency involve a two-step process. In step 1 we abstract from reality by making assumptions. Nobody believes these assumptions. They are the admissions price for the test, and we hope they do only a small amount of damage. Typical assumptions, indeed the assumptions GRS use, are: 1) the process that generates the returns does not change with time, and 2) the returns are normally distributed. The first is needed to limit the problem to finding a fixed but hidden target rather than the harder problem of a hidden and moving target. The second assumption helps make sense out of the statistical tests. It is possible to get around the normality assumption and try to sort out the power of the statistical tests when the returns are not normal. The answer is inevitably that we need more observations in order to get the same level of assurance. This puts more strain on the first assumption because a longer period of observation makes the assumption of stationarity more tenuous.
Once the assumptions are made, we perform the tests and try to sort out the results. This can be difficult for two reasons. First, the conclusion may be affected by our initial assumptions. We are testing both our assumptions and the notion of benchmark efficiency.
A second, and less obvious, problem is in the statistician's notebook (if it indeed exists). Truth in packaging cries out for details on the number of tests run before the conclusions are presented. With today's computers, a fertile imagination, and knowledge of other tests, it is possible to produce spectacular results.
THE GIBBONS, ROSS, AND SHANKEN TEST
The GRS test uses an old-fashioned, back to basics, Markowitz, mean-standard deviation notion of efficiency. The GRS test can be explained in a mean standard deviation framework where excess return (µ) is plotted against risk (σ). Excess return is return less the return on a risk-free investment over the same period. It is often called the risk premium.
We observe an investment universe with N assets (the benchmark and N additional assets) over T periods. In our case, N = 4, and the periods are months. The number of months ranges from T = 67 months for Germany to T = 220 months for the U.S. GRS make the assumptions of stationarity and normality that we detail above.
The task is to see if the benchmark is efficient in terms of expectations. What makes this task so difficult is that we do not know the expected excess returns; we have to try to deduce them from observations. We must distinguish between the ex ante world of unobservable expectations and the ex post world of observed realizations. Let's consider these in turn.
Expectations
For a moment let's play God and presume that we know the expected excess return for each asset and the covariances between all pairs of assets. With that information we can depict the investment opportunities open to us in mean-standard deviation space. This picture will look different depending on whether the benchmark portfolio is efficient. In Exhibit 1 the benchmark is not efficient; in Exhibit 2 the benchmark is efficient.
The parabola in Exhibits 1 and 2 encloses all the fully invested (no cash) mean-standard deviation outcomes available to the investor. The risk-free asset, represented by RF, has a zero expected excess return and zero risk. The portfolio Q * has an expected excess return of 12% per year (1% per month) and minimum risk. The efficient set is the line through RF and Q * . The benchmark portfolio is indicated by B * . Exhibit 1 is the active manager's view of the worldthere is a beatable benchmark. If the active manager has some special insights about the expected excess returns and covariances, the active manager can succeed. Skill can be rewarded.
EXHIBIT 1 EX ANTE INVESTMENT CHOICES: BENCHMARK IS NOT EFFICIENT
Exhibit 2 represents the passive manager's view of the world. Here active managers are in a difficult situation. If they could catch a peek at the unknowable expected excess returns and covariances, active managers still could outperform the benchmark only through luck.
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EXHIBIT 2 EX ANTE INVESTMENT CHOICES:
BENCHMARK IS EFFICIENT
Note the difference. With an inefficient benchmark, some insight into the expected excess returns and covariance gives us a positive chance at success. With an efficient benchmark, perfect knowledge, let alone partial insight, is to no avail.
Realizations
The GRS test looks at realized returns to determine whether Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2 represents the true state of affairs. We don't know the expected excess returns; we have to try to deduce them from observation.
After we have observed the returns for T periods we can draw an ex post efficient frontier. This will look similar to the opportunity sets drawn in Exhibits 1 and 2. The difference is that we can calculate, after the fact, the makeup of the most efficient portfolio over that period.
Even if the benchmark portfolio is efficient in terms of expectations, it will not be efficient in terms of the realizations; i.e., the realized average returns will not equal the expected returns. There will be sample error.
Some portfolio, call it Q, will be the portfolio that yields 12% excess return per year and has minimum realized risk among all portfolios that can make that 12% claim. The realized efficient set in Exhibit 3 is the line from RF through Q. The realized performance of the benchmark is indicated by the point B. The notation, Q and B for realizations, is used to distinguish the realizations from the expectations Q * and B * .
The statistics help us distinguish the case where the benchmark is efficient (Exhibit 2) from the case where the benchmark is not efficient (Exhibit 1). The question is decided by asking if B is close enough to the line from RF through Q.
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The GRS test tells us if we are close enough.
Sharpe Ratios and Information Ratios
The point [µ p ,σ p ] in Exhibit 3 gives the realized excess return and volatility of portfolio P. The slope of the line from the origin RF through the point [µ p ,σ p ] portfolio is called the Sharpe ratio, SR p , of portfolio P; i.e., SR p = µ p /σ p . In Exhibit 3 we show the lines defining the Sharpe ratios for portfolios B, P, and Q. Portfolio Q, by definition, has the highest Sharpe ratio.
EXHIBIT 3 EX POST INVESTMENT OUTCOMES
The residual return of any portfolio is that component of return uncorrelated with the bench mark's return. 4 T h e information ratio for portfolio P, IR p , is the ratio of the average residual return (α p ) to residual risk (ω p ); i.e., IR p = α p /ω p . The information ratio is important in active management (see Grinold [1989] ).
The information ratio of portfolio Q is critical because the GRS test revolves around a test statistic that involves the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark, SR B , and the information ratio of portfolio Q, IR Q .
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Suppose we look at the frontier produced by N assets (plus the benchmark) over T monthly periods. The test statistic is
(1)
Under the assumption that the benchmark is efficient, the statistic F will have the F distribution with degrees of freedom N and T -N -1.
Defining the Investment Choices
The GRS test requires T time periods and N assets, where N must be less than T -1. As the number of stocks in most benchmarks is large, and not much data are available, we must limit the ability of the investor to select among the assets. GRS give three examples using U.S. data of how one might deal with this problem. They divide the assets into twelve sector portfolios, into decile portfolios ordered by size, and into decile portfolios ordered by beta.
Tilt Portfolios
We will use four tilt portfolios (N = 4) as our assets. (Tilt portfolios are also called factor portfolios or mimicking portfolios.) The tilt portfolios are set up using the BARRA system and employ the factors or concepts: VOLATILITY, MOMENTUM, SIZE, and VALUE.
7 Each tilt portfolio represents a pure bet on a single factor because it neutralizes any incidental exposure to other factors.
For example, the VOLATILITY tilt portfolio matches the benchmark portfolio on all industries and on all the risk indexes (e.g., SIZE, MOMENTUM, and VALUE) of the B A R R A m o d e l , e x c e p t i t h a s a n e x p o s u r e t o t h e VOLATILITY factor that is greater than the exposure of the benchmark. Even if stocks in the financial sector are more volatile than stocks in the industrial sector, the VOLATILITY tilt portfolio will not overemphasize the financials at the expense of the industrials. It will, instead, hold each sector at its benchmark weight and tend to hold the more volatile stocks within each sector.
The SIZE portfolio favors larger stocks at the expense of smaller stocks. Note that this allows us to bet on smaller stocks. For example, a mix of 0.9 on the benchmark, 0.25 on the VALUE tilt, and minus 0.15 on the SIZE portfolio would be a mix that bets on smaller value stocks. In the same way we can bet on low-volatility stocks by holding a negative exposure for the VOLATILITY tilt portfolio.
The tilt portfolios are extremely effective in capturing a concept. The GRS size decile portfolios use ten assets to capture the notion of size, while the SIZE tilt portfolio captures that idea with one asset.
Using the tilt portfolios clears us of most charges of data mining.
8 These tilt portfolios were all designed before the GRS test was derived. The tilts were fashioned to explain as much volatility as possible with intelligible factors. We use the same factors in each market; their cloth was not cut to fit the returns in each market.
HOW CAN WE INTERPRET THESE TESTS?
Before we are distracted by the numbers, we should adjust our expectations about what we may or may not learn from these tests. Our specification of the investment choices establishes a context; the test takes place within that context (see the two Dybvig and Ross articles [1985] ). If the benchmark is inefficient in that context, an investment manager with knowledge of the expected excess returns on the available investment choices would have an opportunity to outperform the benchmark.
If the benchmark is efficient in our context, we cannot make the symmetric statement that the manager would not have a chance to outperform. We can make a weaker statement: any manager who limits the choices in the same way that we have limited ours, and who restricts the portfolio strategy to a constant mix of the choices, would be in a tight spot. A manager who has other investment choices has not been tested by this procedure.
For example, suppose we are using the investment choices allowed by the four tilt portfolios. A manager who makes sector bets is not challenged by the tests we have outlined because all our investment choices have an identical sector mix; i.e., no matter how we combine the tilt funds we always get the same sector exposure as the benchmark. To test the sector manager, we would have to define the investment choices in terms of sector portfolios. Even this may not be enough.
There is a more subtle point. We are allowing the manager to hold a portfolio that overweights some sectors and underweights others, but we are not allowing for sector rotation. Suppose the investment manager has some technical investment rule, such as overweight a sector that did well in the last quarter and poorly in the three quarters before that, and under weight a sector that did poorly in the last quarter and well in the three quarters before that.
We could not test that sector rotation strategy with a choice set that is based on holding the sectors in constant proportion (rebalancing) throughout. It may be that the expected excess returns on the sectors are consistent with benchmark efficiency, but the expected excess returns conditional on performance over the last four quarters are not consistent with benchmark efficiency (see Dybvig and Ross [1985] ).
The Data
Exhibit 4 shows the ex post frontier for the United States using data from January 1973 through April 1991; T = 220. Point B represents the S&P 500, point Q a portfolio with maximum Sharpe ratio, and VOL, MOM, SZE, and VAL the four tilt portfolios. Although the tilt portfolios do not perform in a way that is drastically different from the benchmark, the ability to mix the four with the benchmark and the risk-free asset produces some dramatic results.
The efficient frontier shown in Exhibit 4 is based on the outcomes that can be obtained with no restrictions on the mix of cash, the benchmark, and the four tilts. With no restrictions we can achieve an information ratio of 1.85. If we restrict the mix so that we do not allow cash (fully invested), and we keep the portfolio beta equal to one, then the information ratio drops to 1.67.
EXHIBIT 4 U.S. RESULTS
Experience indicates that implementation for a sizable institutional portfolio that includes restrictions on short sales, liquidity, and transaction costs would drop the information ratio for a strategy with about 3% residual risk into the 0.9 to 0.6 region. This is still respectable although only one-half to one-third of the initial figure. The properties of the U.S. portfolios and the portfolios in all the other countries are described in Exhibit 5. The risk and return numbers are in % per year. Several important points are worth noting.
• The Sharpe ratios average about 0.31.
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• The t-statistics indicate the significance of the alpha in a regression of the portfolio's excess return against the benchmark's excess return.
• The betas of the Q portfolios are very low. Portfolio Q is the result of an unconstrained optimization and can be very strange indeed. In fact, for Germany and Japan, portfolio Q has a net short position in B and the four tilts.
• VALUE does well in all five markets and has a significant t-statistic in four markets.
• SIZE, betting on small stocks, has been marginally good in the U.S. and Japan, and of no significant value elsewhere.
• MOMENTUM, going with the winners, has been a successful policy in the English-speaking countries, while the opposite is true in Germany and Japan.
• The t-statistics for portfolio Q are very significant in four of the countries and significant in Germany. Portfolio Q, however was selected after the fact. The regression test won't correct for that bit of data mining. The GRS test will.
With the returns from Exhibit 5 in hand we can proceed with the test. 
EXHIBIT 5
The Tests
Results of the tests are summarized in Exhibit 6. For each of the five countries we show the data used to calculate the F statistic in Equations (1) and (2). The numerator (N) and denominator (T -N -1) degrees of freedom are shown. The probability number shows the chance of such an outcome if we assume that the benchmark portfolio is ex ante efficient.
As one can see, it isn't very likely in four of the five countries and is extremely unlikely in Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. We see that Germany is not significant at the 5% level when we apply the GRS test, although the regression t-statistic for portfolio Q's alpha is significant. The caveats mentioned earlier about statistical tests should serve to moderate our glee or despair over these results. They indicate that tilt strategies have been effective over the periods in question. We may never know the extent that data mining and non-stationary or non-normality have influenced our results. It is possible to turn the econometrics up a notch or two to check for conditional heteroscedasticity (see Shanken [1990] ).
CONCLUSIONS
We have tested the efficiency of investment benchmarks in five major markets. We find that the benchmarks are not ex ante efficient in four of the five cases. Value-based investing has been successful in all the markets.
These results should be viewed as indicative and not conclusive. The tests are based on assumptions of normality and stationarity and on our specification of the investment choices. We test strategies that tilted toward (or away from) four factors: VOLATILITY, MOMENTUM, SIZE, and VALUE. Our selection of the investment choices is motivated by prior knowledge that these factors are useful for characterizing asset returns, and any test of this sort leaves a rich mix of strategies untested.
ENDNOTES
The author thanks Jay Shanken for his guidance and help over some tight spots.
1 Actually GRS require normality only for the residual component of returns, i.e., that component that is not correlated with the benchmark. 2 This will be strictly true if we have captured all the possible investment strategies in our efficient frontier. It turns out that this is very difficult to do.
3 Decided as much as statisticians decide anything. In fact, you get something like: there is a less than 5% chance of observing these results by chance. 4 If r p (t) and r B (t) are the excess returns on the portfolio and benchmark, respectively, and we do the regression r p (t) = α p + β p × r B (t) + e p (t), then α p + e p (t) is the residual retu rn.
5 Q has the highest information ratio too. One can show that IR p = Corr{θ p ,θ Q } × IR Q , where θ p represents the residual return on any portfolio P, and Corr{θ p ,θ Q } is the correlation be tween θ p and θ Q . 6 It turns out that {SR Q } 2 = {SR B } 2 + {IR Q } 2 ; see equation (23) in the appendix to the GRS paper. This relationship is always true in terms of expectations; i.e., if we knew the expected excess returns and covariances this result will hold. It is also true in terms of realizations, except one has to be careful to use maximum likelihood estimates of the variance (no adjustment for degrees of freedom). The 12 in this formula comes from our stating the Sharpe ratio and information ratio in annual rather than monthly terms. The annual Sharpe ratio or information ratio is the monthly number multiplied by the square root of 12. All tests were performed with monthly data.
7 These concepts are defined in a slightly different way in each market. For details please write to the author. 
